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The ironic operation: revisiting the components of ironic meaning 
Abstract 
This paper sheds more light on the way in which irony functions at the 
semantics/pragmatics interface by teasing apart three components of the ironic operation: 
the vehicle, the input, and the output. Focusing on the logical relationship between the 
expressed and the intended meaning of the ironic utterance, several real instantiations of 
the phenomenon are discussed and it is demonstrated that the vehicle (i.e. the unit of 
meaning that is used in an ironic way, thus carrying the ironic intent) does not always 
coincide with the input (i.e. the unit of meaning on which irony operates). The input to the 
ironic operation is thus shown to be of three kinds: (a) part of the vehicle, (b) triggered by 
the vehicle, or (c) discourse-dependent. The final discussion highlights the advantages of 
viewing irony as an operation rather than an act of mention or dissociation from the content 
of the utterance. 
Keywords: irony, ironic operation, ironic vehicle, (direct) ironic output 
Introduction
When reviewing the most widely discussed (semantic-)pragmatic approaches to irony, one 
can discern two contrasting tendencies, both in terms of theoretical analysis and in terms 
of predictions about processing effects: one that stays closer to the Gricean tradition and 
takes into account the role of the literal interpretation of the utterance (Giora, 1995, 2011, 
as well as proponents of a )꼀sHPDQWLFLVW)?view, as Camp, 2012 defines it, e.g. Bach and 
Harnish, 1979 and Potts, 2005), and one that places emphasis on WKH VSHDNHU)?V
dissociative attitude towards the content of the utterance (Sperber and Wilson, 1981; Clark 
and Gerrig, 1984; Gibbs, 1986, 2002; *LEEVDQG2)?%ULHQ, 1991; Wilson and Sperber, 1992, 
2012; Wilson, 2006). The present account of the phenomenon is more in line with the 
former approaches, investigating the links and pathways between the literal and nonliteral 
aspects of ironic meaning. At the same time, however, the phenomenon is not viewed as 
a literal-nonliteral duality, but as a dynamic process that involves different levels and 
sources of meaning.  
The motivation for this analysis comes from a recent emergence of accounts that move 
away from single-strategy views like WKHFODVVLFDO)?opposite of what is said)? (Grice, 1975), 




the Relevance Theoretic echoic mention, and &ODUNDQG*HUULJ)?V pretence, and 
emphasise the variability and diversity of irony strategies (Kapogianni, 2011, 2013; Dynel, 
2013a, 2013b). The realisation that irony possesses a more complicated profile than 
previously thought poses a new set of questions that need further examination:  
(a) What classifications can be made among irony strategies?  
(b) What are the unifying characteristics of such a diverse phenomenon?  
The manner in which (a) is dealt with can vary depending on the nature of the research 
question; for example, Kapogianni (2011, 2013) presents a classification based on the 
criterion of the relationship between what is said and what is implicated, while the present 
discussion aims at a classification based on the source of the input of the ironic operation. 
On the other hand, (b) presents a definitional problem that needs to be addressed before 
any further discussion and data analysis. 
Approaching the phenomenon of irony with a definition that is wide enough to 
encompass all possible strategies and narrow enough to exclude any cases of non-irony 
that are often mistaken for such1 is a methodologically difficult task, that can only be 
achieved through a careful balance and constant interaction between theory and real data. 
Following a two-stage process of feedback between theory-independent (based on native 
VSHDNHUV)?LQWXLWLRQVDQGWKHRU\-internal data collection, Kapogianni (2013) proposes a set 
of three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the presence of the phenomenon2, 
which is adopted in the present analysis (Table 1). 
 
Condition Explanation 
Background contrast There needs to be some sort of clash in the 
background of the ironic utterance. This can be a 
contrast between ideas, beliefs, or expectations 
(speaker versus hearer, ideal conditions versus 
reality, etc.) 
                                            
1 Such would be the case of non-ironic sarcasm, which is often confounded with irony in the literature)? cf. 
Dynel (2014:634-635). 
2 Burgers et al. 2011 follow a similar methodology for the creation of their verbal irony recognition algorithm 
(Verbal Irony Procedure), the difference being in that they focus on indicators for the detection of the 
phenomenon rather than the elements that constitute its essence. 




Incongruity between what is 
said and some element of the 
context at hand 
This condition broadens the usual observation that 
ironic statements are counterfactual. An ironically 
intended utterance can express something which is 
not necessarily counterfactual but is in some strong 
contrast with the contextual expectations. 
6SHDNHU)?VHYDOXDWLYHDWWLWXGH In all cases of irony, the speaker intends to make 
some sort of evaluation (cf. Grice, 1978). This is 
normally, but not necessarily, negative (cf. Sperber 
and Wilson, 1981:312; contra Garmendia, 2010, 
2011). 
 
Table 1 Necessary conditions for the presence of irony (according to Kapogianni 2013:19- )  
 
The working hypothesis of this paper is that meaning reversal is another common 
denominator of all ironic strategies, but the meaning that becomes reversed (input of the 
ironic process) can come from a variety of sources and is often the product of inference. 
The first step for this analysis is to describe the ironic operation and its components 
(section 2), highlighting the important distinction between vehicle (the carrier of ironic 
intent) and input. Illustrated through a variety of examples, this examination leads to a 
classification of irony strategies depending on the source of input (section 3). The final 
discussion (section 4) justifies the pragmatic approach of irony as an operation, supporting 
the view that the literal meaning of the utterance, along with a variety of meanings 
stemming from it, takes SDUWLQWKHSURFHVVRIGHULYDWLRQRIWKHLURQLVW)?VLQWHQGHGPHDQLQJ  
 
 Breaking down the ironic operation: vehicle, input, and output 
 
In this section, it is argued that, aside from the distinction between different levels of 
PHDQLQJ )?ZKDW LV VDLG)뀀 )? 꼀wKDW LV LPSOLFDWHG)뀀 LQ *ULFHDQ WHUPV RU )?explicature)? and 
)?implicature)? in Relevance Theoretic terms), some more refined distinctions are needed, 
specific to irony as a trope, if a better understanding of the semantic-pragmatic 
characteristics of the phenomenon is to be achieved.  
 




2.1 Why is irony an operation? 
Ironic meaning, being the product of a rhetorical trope, is not like any other particularised 
conversational implicature. Ironic implicatures have limited indeterminacy, are highly 
systematic, and they are the result of a logical process that could be described in terms of 
an algorithm.  
Grice recognises indeterminacy as one of the main characteristics of implicatures 
(Grice, 1989:39-40). He argues that the derivation of conversational implicatures relies on 
an open list of possible explanations, allowing for some uncertainty (or even 
XQSUHGLFWDELOLW\ LQ WKH SURFHVV ZKLFK LV KLJKO\ GHSHQGHQW RQ WKH KHDUHU)?V VHW RI
assumptions. In the case of irony, however, the characteristic of indeterminacy seems 
rather limited. As shown in (1), irony often relies on specific implicated premises that lead 
to implicated conclusions.  
(1) Context: This is a discussion among several members of an online community about 
arranging a meeting a few hours later. Speaker B lives in a different country. 
A: So are you all coming? 
B: Sure, let me just use my teleportation device. [source: Blogs/forums (English)] 
i.  If your question is valid (i.e. in this case, if it has considered all the relevant 
information) then my answer is also valid. 
ii. My answer states an impossibility (i.e. that I own a working teleportation 
device). 
iii. Your question is invalid (your question ignores an important piece of 
information). 
There is a rather straightforward logical sequence here, which can be followed from (1-i) 
to the conclusion in (1-iii). SSHDNHU%)?VLPSRVVLEOHVWDWHPHQWLVMX[WDSRVHGWRVSHDNHU$)?V
question in order to give rise to an implicated criticism (1-iii). This is what Sperber and 
:LOVRQ  ZRXOG FDOO D )꼀sWURQJ)뀀 LPSOLFDWXUH LH RQH ZKLFK LQFOXGHV IXOO\
determinate premises and conclusions. The example of ironic oxymoron in (2), where the 
literal lexical meaning ()?disgust/nonsense)?) is juxtaposed to an ironically used word 
()?wonderful)?), makes an even stronger case for the lack of indeterminacy, since an ironic 
reading is necessary for the assignment of truth-evaluable content to the utterance that 
contains it (oxymoron will be further discussed in section 3.1). 




(2) Meriki onirevonde mia Elada pu tha bi se hronokapsula ke den tha alaksi SRWH)?mia 
iperohi aidia diladi. [source: Blogs/forums (Greek)] 
)?Some people dream of Greece being placed in a time-capsule and never 
FKDQJLQJ)뤀awonderful disgust/nonsense that is)?. 
This is not to say, of course, that ironic implicatures consistently lack indeterminacy 
altogether. Limited indeterminacy can, however, be considered the result of systematicity, 
which is an important feature of irony. 
)꼀S\VWHPDWLFLW\)뀀 LVmeant in the sense that there is a determinate link between the 
meaning of the utterance and the intended meaning. This link may be a semantic 
relationship of antonymy, as in example (2) and in most typical cases of irony, or it may 
be a more complex relationship that is based on a syllogism like the one presented in 
example (1). In fact, it has been shown with the support of corpus data (Kapogianni, 2013) 
that these two possibilities (antonymy and a Modus Tollens syllogism) constitute the two 
main types of irony, for a typological distinction that concerns the relationship between 
what is said and what is ironically implicated. 
Accepting the logical connection between what is said and what is implicated, in the 
case of irony, means recognising that the use and retrieval of ironic meaning entails a 
specific operation. Although the exact nature of this operation remains to be discussed in 
the following sections, through the examination of further examples, it is worth putting 
forward the idea that this operation has to involve some kind of meaning reversal. There 
are two non-theory-specific arguments that can support this claim)LUVWQDWLYHVSHDNHUV)?
intuitions about irony, which have also led to formal analyses of the phenomenon from the 
times of Aristotle to modern pragmatic theory, all seem to point to the element of reversal 
(even when identifying it with a different term such as negation, contrast or 
inappropriateness )? cf. Attardo, 2000) as a constant characteristic of irony. Second, 
maintaining the notion of reversal as a unifying characteristic of verbal irony is consistent 
with the character of irony as a general phenomenon (umbrella term) that also applies to 
events (situational/cosmic irony), dramatic devices (dramatic/tragic irony), and even the 
UKHWRULFDOGHYLFHRI)꼀SRFUDWLFLURQ\)뀀. 




2.2  What is the direct output of the ironic operation? 
First of all, it needs to be made clear that ironic meaning does not consist of a single 
proposition but of a bundle of propositions, as illustrated in example (3): 
(3) Context: Veronica is about to join some classmates of hers in a game of poker. It is 
part of the common ground that she is in bad terms with these people and that she 
has a low opinion of them. 
Logan: Do you even know how to play poker? 
Veronica: (i) No, but it must be really hard if all you guys play. >6RXUFH)?9HURQLFD0DUV)?)? 
TV series] 
(ii) 1. The difficulty of the game must correspond to your intelligence. 2. +> You are 
all very intelligent. 
(iii) The speaker is being ironic. 
(iv) 1. You are not inteOOLJHQW7KHJDPHFDQ)?WEHKDUG  
(v) 1. I can easily join you in your game. 2. Your question is pointless. 
 
In this example, common ground knowledge predisposes both the external observer3 and 
the hearers towards an ironic interpretation, which makes (iii) an easy assumption. 
However, (iv) is reached only if the interpreters draw the necessary inferences from the 
explicit meaning of the utterance as in (ii). Furthermore, the existence of additional 
implicatures, derived on the basis of the ironic interpretation, such as in (v), cannot be 
disregarded. Of course, the propositions that constitute the ironic meaning are not 
presented in a random order here but in a way that reflects two kinds of priority: (a) logical 
priority: some implicated propositions are necessary premises, without the presence of 
which the reasoning would not proceed further (e.g. ii-1 is necessary for the derivation of 
ii-2 and iv-1 has a logical priority over iv-2) and (b) communicative priority: normally, only 
RQHRIWKHVHSURSRVLWLRQVLVWKHVSHDNHU)?VPDLQLQWHQGHGPHDQLQJRU)꼀pULPDU\LQWHQGHG
PHDQLQJ)뀀 - see Jaszczolt, 2009), some of the implicatures having secondary 
communicative importance (e.g. v-1 can be considered the main intended meaning here, 
having a communicative priority over the evaluative proposition in v-2). 
                                            
3 7KHH[DPSOHFRPHVIURPD79VKRZ)?9HURQLFD0DUV)?VRWKHPDLQLQWHUSUHWHUVRIWKHFRQYH\HGPHDQLQJ
here, are considered to be the viewers, instead of the scripted hearers. 




Despite the fact that a closer look to ironic meaning presents a rather complex picture, 
what is of primary interest, here, is the proposition that can be analysed as the direct (or 
immediate) output of the ironic operation. This can only be determined relatively to the 
utterance: the implicated proposition which has the closest logical relation with some part 
of the meaning expressed by the utterance must be the immediate output of the ironic 
operation4. Conversely, the unit of meaning expressed by the utterance which can be 
logically linked to some part of the ironic meaning is the input of the ironic operation. In 
H[DPSOHWKHQL)?it >WKHJDPH@PXVWEHUHDOO\KDUG)뀀 DQGLY-2)?the game FDQ)?WEH
KDUG)뀀 DUHOLQNHGthrough antonymy and so are (3ii-)꼀yRXDUHDOOYHU\LQWHOOLJHQW)뀀 DQG(3iv-
1 )꼀yRXDUHQRW LQWHOOLJHQW)뀀.%RWK L DQG LL-2) can be considered inputs to the ironic 
operation here, with the respective immediate outputs being (3iv-2) and (3iv-1). In other 
words, input and direct output can only be defined and detected as a pair of logically linked 
propositions. 
2.3 What is the ironic vehicle? 
So far, the input and the direct output have been defined as a pair of logically linked 
meanings that pertain to the ironic operation. There is a third notion, however, that the 
following sections will show to be equally crucial for the understanding of the phenomenon, 
and this is the ironic vehicle. The term vehicle does not pertain to the conceptualisation of 
the ironic operation but it is rather a term related to the rhetorical nature of irony. Similarly 
to the vehicle of the metaphor being WKHSKUDVHWKDWFRQYH\VWKHPHWDSKRUHJ)꼀sKDUN)?
WRFRQYH\)꼀rXWKOHVV)뀀,WKHODWWHUEHLQJWKHWHQRU)? see Richards, 1936), the vehicle of the 
irony is the word or string of words that is uttered with an ironic intent. As will be amply 
illustrated in the following sections, the ironic vehicle is usually a single utterance, but its 
size can be either minimised, functioning as an ironic interjection in an otherwise literal 
utterance, or extended, even taking the size of a whole text HJ-RKQDWKDQ6ZLIW)?V )?A 
Modest PURSRVDO)?. 
  
                                            
4 Note that for all subsequent examples (4-18), the discussion will focus on the direct output of the ironic 
operation. 





 The relationship between vehicle and input 
 
The fact that irony is able to operate on meaning that is not part of the literal content of 
the utterance is an important observation (Kapogianni, 2010, 2013 and Camp, 2012) 
which has been attributed to the variability of scope of verbal irony. In the present analysis, 
ZKHUHWKHWHUPVLQSXWDQGYHKLFOHDUHFHQWUDOWRWKHGLVFXVVLRQWKHXVHRIWKHWHUP)꼀sFRSH)뀀 
would be redundant. Camp (2012) elaborates oQWKHUDQJHRI)꼀sFRSHV)뀀 WKDW sarcasm5 can 
take, in a semantic account that even proposes a SARC operator (Camp, 2012:590). A 
potential problem of classifying ironic strategies on the basis of scope is the danger of 
confounding the input of the ironic operation and the vehicle of the irony. Camp, for 
example, mentions )꼀tDUJHWRI LQYHUVLRQ)뀀 and )꼀iQSXW)뀀 (ibid: 587, 590) without making the 
distinction from scope, leaving the ambiguity of the latter untreated. This section discusses 
a wide range of real instantiations of irony (coming from a variety of Modern Greek and 
English sources), with the aim of classifying them according to the provenance of the input. 
It is shown that the input can coincide with the vehicle, be part of it (section 3.1), it can be 
triggered by the vehicle (3.2), or it can arise through discourse (3.3). 
 
3.1 Input as (part of) the vehicle 
)RUWKHPRVWIUHTXHQWO\GLVFXVVHGLURQLFH[DPSOHVRIWKH)꼀yRXDUHDILQHIULHQG)뀀 NLQG6) the 
vehicle and the input of the operation are almost indistinguishable. This is because the 
ironic intent is carried by the whole proposition, which is also the unit of meaning that gets 
reversed. However, as the following examples demonstrate, even in the most typical 
cases of irony, it is not always the case that the vehicle fully coincides with the input of the 
ironic operation. 
 
(4) Penny: Why would I want to see it [this film] again on Friday? 
                                            
5 &DPSIRFXVHVRQ)?VDUFDVP)뀀 DVDZLGHUSKHQRPHQRQWKDQLURQ\DQGVKHWKHUHIRUHGLVFXVVHV
examples that would be considered as noniURQLF VDUFDVP HJ VDUFDVWLF )?OLNH)뀀) DOWKRXJK VKH GRHV QRW
explicitly categorise them as such. 
6 This was the typical example discussed by Grice (1975) and subsequently used in most pragmatic 
papers on irony and early experiments (Gibbs, 1986, 2002). It is a standard simple example of meaning the 
reverse of what is said, and it is so frequently used that it can almost be considered conventionalized.  




Leonard: Because the print they're showing on Friday has an additional 21 seconds 
of previously unseen footage.  
Penny: 21 seconds? That'll be like seeing a whole new movie! [source: )?The Big Bang 
Theory)? )? TV series] 
(5) Context: Discussing an inconvenient job offer that involves moving abroad as well as 
receiving a very low salary 
A: Esi tha pigenes? 
 )?:RXOG\RXJR> DFFHSWWKHMRERIIHU@")? 
B: Mu aresi o ilios kserete. 
)?, like the sun, you know)? 
 A: A, ohi oti plironese 10 fores parapano stin Athina 
   )?2K>LW)?V@Qot that you get paid 10 times more in Athens)? [source: Blogs/forums (Greek)] 
(6) &RQWH[W$)꼀hDYH\RXHYHU)?RQOLQHTXHVWLRQQDLUHDQVZHUHGE\PHPEHUVof a forum. 
A: [Have you ever] thought about running away?  
B: From what? All the lovely disappointment or the nice racist bastards I hate? [source: 
Blogs/forums (English)] 
 
In example (4), the direct output of the ironic operation LV )?that [21 seconds] makes 
absolutely no difference in the movie7)뀀. 7KLV FDQ EHviewed as the reversal of the 
SURSRVLWLRQ H[SUHVVHG E\ %)?V XWWHUDQFH As was suggested in section 2.2., the term 
)꼀mHDQLQJUHYHUVDO)?LVWKHDSSURSULDWHWHUPIRUWKLVNLQGRILURQLFRSHUDWLRQ7KLVLs unlike 
some older approaches to irony (namely, the Gricean approach) that use the term 
)꼀mHDQLQJQHJDWLRQ)뀀 LQVWHDG)꼀NHJDWLRQ)뀀,DVZDVDOVRDUJXHGE\*LRUDZRXOG\LHOG
DGLIIHUHQWRXWSXWLQWKLVFDVH)꼀tKDWZRQ)?WEHOLNHVHHLQJDZKROHQHZPRYLH)뀀) which falls 
VKRUW LQFDSWXULQJ WKHVSHDNHU)?V LQWHQGHGSURSRVLWLRQThere is, however, one instance 
where irony can be seen as direct negation and this is the case of an ironic negative 
utterance as in (5)ZKHUH)꼀iW >WKHUHDVRQ\RXZRXOGQ)?WDFFHSWWKLVRIfer] is not that you get 
SDLG)뤌뀀 EHFRPHV)꼀iW>WKHUHDVRQ\RXZRXOGQ)?WDFFHSWWKLVRIIHU@is that you get paid)뤌뀀.,WLV
exactly this kind of example that also brings forth a problem of ambiguity regarding the 
                                            
7 $ UHYLHZHUKLJKOLJKWHGVRPH DGGLWLRQDO LQWHQGHGPHDQLQJV LQ WKLVH[DPSOH VXFKDV )?\RXJX\V DUH
QHUGV)?DQG)?,ZRQ)?WFRPHZLWK\RXWRWKHPRYLH)뀀.,QWKHSDUWLFXODUFRQWH[WWKHVHwould be secondary intended 
meanings, according to the discussion in section 2.2. 




unit of meaning on which irony operates: does irony operate on the whole proposition, as 
in the previous example, or does it just cancel the negation? The ability of irony to operate 
locally is indeed something that has been well documented in the literature (Cutler, 1974; 
Camp, 2012; Palinkas, 2013). 
Perhaps the most convincing kind of example for this characteristic of irony is the case 
of ironic oxymoron. Example (6) presents a case of oxymoron used by speaker B on two 
RFFDVLRQV)꼀lRYHO\GLVDSSRLQWPHQW)뀀 DQG)꼀nLFHUDFLVWEDVWDUGV)뀀. ,QWKHFDVHRIR[\Poron, 
irony has to operate at a local SUHGLFDWH OHYHO WXUQLQJ )꼀lRYHO\)? DQG )꼀nLFH)뀀 LQWR WKHLU
RSSRVLWHVZKLOHOHDYLQJWKHPHDQLQJRI)꼀dLVDSSRLQWPHQW)?DQG)꼀rDFLVWEDVWDUGV)?XQDIIHFWHG 
FI3DUWLQJWRQ)?VDQDO\VLVRIHYDOXDWLYHR[\PRURQ, Partington, 2011:1789). At the same 
time, certain structural restrictions can also lead to a localised ironic operation. A good 
example is the case of conditionals (cf. Haverkate, 1990; &DPSVXFKDV)꼀iI*HRUJH
KDVVDLG WKDW KH LVDJHQLXV)뀀 +DYHUNDWH, 1990:80), where irony only operates on the 
conclusion, leaving the antecedent unaffected. 
Going back to the distinction between vehicle and input, it would be difficult to imagine 
the ironists in examples (5) and (6) as limiting their ironic intent to the words that are 
ironically reversed. In other words, it is the whole utterance that is used to carry the ironic 
intent (vehicle) despite the fact that irony may only operate on the negation in (5) and only 
on the positive evaluations (lovely, nice) in (6). This is a first instance of a mismatch 
between vehicle and input, which will become apparent in the following sections. While 
observing cases of such mismatch, it is also worth considering that the relationship 
between vehicle and input can depend on different factors: (a) the relationship can be 
constrained by structural elements, like explicit negation and conditionals, (b) it can be 
dictated by the semantics, e.g. when oxymoron is used, it is the incongruity between 
modifier and noun that leads to the ironic interpretation of the modifier, and (c) the 
distinction between vehicle and input can be purely the result of context (as will be 
demonstrated in example 12). 
3.2 Input that is triggered by the vehicle 
In this section I discuss examples of irony where the input of the ironic operation is not 
part of the vehicle but it is triggered by it instead. In example (7), the speaker is about to 
take part in a football game, before which the two head players are choosing teams. Since 




no one has chosen her, the speaker utters (7) ironically, expressing her disappointment 
about the fact that no one is interested in her. 
 
(7) Pedia, stamatiste na skotoneste pios tha me pari! 
i. )?*X\Vstop fighting RYHUZKRZLOOKDYHPH)?>VRXUFH)?6)?DJDSRP)?DJDSDV)?)? TV series (Greek)] 
ii. You are fighting over me [presupposition] 
iii. No one is interested in me [direct output of the ironic operation-intended meaning] 
 
The intended meaning here is not the reversal of the expressed meaning (7i), ()?start 
ILJKWLQJRYHUZKRZLOOKDYHPH)뀀)EXWLQVWHDGWKHLQWHnded meaning )꼀nRRQHLVLQWHUHVWHG
LQPH)뀀 is derived on the basis of a presupposition arising from the utterance: )꼀sWRSILJKWLQJ
RYHUPH)뀀 SUHVXSSRVHV)꼀yRXDUHILJKWLQJRYHUPH)뀀. The logical link between the input (7ii) 
and the output (7iii) is still that of reversal, here, despite the fact that this is not a case of 
antonymy but rather a case of reversal of an ad-KRFVFDOHVXFKDV)?QRWEHLQJLQWHUHVWHG
ZDQWLQJGHPDQGLQJEHLQJZLOOLQJWRILJKWRYHU)? (Kapogianni, 2013:53).  
Under this light, it is also worth discussing (8), a frequently debated example (also 
GLVFXVVHGE\*LEEVDQG2)?%ULHQ, 1991; Hamamoto, 1998; Sperber and Wilson, 1998, inter 
alios) in the context of which, a mother enters her son's room and notices that it is 
extremely untidy. 
 
(8) i. I like children who keep their rooms clean! 
ii.Your room is clean [pragmatic inference from (i)] 
iii. Your room is dirty/untidy [direct output of the ironic operation] 
 
2IFRXUVH LWFDQQRWEHFODLPHGWKDW WKHPRWKHU LQWHQGV WRPHDQ)꼀Ihate children who 
NHHSWKHLUURRPVFOHDQ)뀀.,WFDQWKHUHIRUHEHDUJXHGWKDWWKHUHYHUVHGPHDQLQJKHUHLV
that of an inference triggered by the utterance, namely the inference that the mother likes 
the fact that this particular room is clean: this arises through a conventional assumption 
that a speaker H[FODLPLQJ )꼀I OLNH[)?, in a context where x is a salient event/situation, 
considers x to be true in that context.  
Given the logical link between the expressed meaning (8i) and the meaning that is used 
as the input to the ironic operation (8ii), one could consider the latter to be a case of 
)꼀pUDJPDWLF SUHVXSSRVLWLRQ)뀀 DV GHVFULEHG E\ 6WDOQDNHU  6LPODUO\ WR UHJXODU




presuppositions, literally (non-ironically) negating the expressed proposition ()?,GRQ)?WOLNH
children who keep their rooms clean)?ZRXOG UHWDLQ WKH LQIHUHQFH )꼀yRXU URRP LVFOHDQ)뀀,
HYHQWKRXJKWKLVZRXOGEHHDVLO\FDQFHOODEOH)?,GRQ)?WOLNHFKLOGUHQZKRNHHSWKHLUURRPV
FOHDQVRLWGRHVQ)?WPDWWHUWKDW\RXUURRPLVPHVV\)뀀)KHQFHLWV SUDJPDWLFQDWXre.  
What is also worth discussing is the ironic use of speech acts, as in examples (9) and 
(10) below, which are both taken from twitter: 
 
(9) Context: Referring to a co-worker with whom the speaker has had a row. 
i. Thank you so much for making work awkward again #NotReally #sarcasm [source: 
Twitter] 
ii. I blame you for making work awkward [speech act of blame )? direct output of the 
ironic operation] 
(10) Context: Discussing the fan club of a singer that the speaker dislikes. 
i. Sign me up ASAP! #sarcasm [source: Twitter] 
ii. I want to be signed up [presupposed felicity condition of the speech act] 
iii. I dRQ)?WFDUHDERXWEHLQJVLJQHGXS [direct output of the ironic operation] 
 
The expression of gratitude DQ H[SUHVVLYH VSHHFK DFW DFFRUGLQJ WR 6HDUOH)?V1975 
distinctions) in (9) is turned into an act of accusing/blaming, that is, another expressive 
speech act of negative evaluative character, as opposed to the positive evaluative 
character of its literal meaning. In this case, irony does not operate on the content of the 
locution, but on the presupposition that arises from the felicity conditions of the speech 
DFW )꼀tKH VSHDNHU LV JUDWHIXO)? (cf. Garmendia, 2015:61). Similarly, in example (10), 
assuming that the intention of the ironist is to express her contempt and disinterest towards 
VRPH IDQ FOXE WKH LQSXW RI WKH LURQLF RSHUDWLRQ VKRXOG EH WKH SUHVXSSRVLWLRQ )꼀I DP
interested ,ZDQWWKLV)?DVLWVWHPVIURPWKHIHOLFLW\FRQGLWLRQVRIDVSHHFKDFWRIRUGHU
request.  
Another interesting case of mismatch between vehicle and input is presented in 
example (11), which contains a non-truth conditional constituent, in this case an ethical 
GDWLYHFOLWLFSURQRXQ)?PDV)뀀 )? )꼀oQXV)뀀) 
 
(11)  Context: Dora is the leader of a political party that the speaker does not support. 




Mas8  tis  exase tis ekloges i Dora! 
On-us them lost the elections the Dora. 
i. )?'RUDORVWWKHHOHFWLRQVWRRXUGLVDSSRLQWPHQW)?9. 
ii. We are GLVDSSRLQWHG DERXW 'RUD)?V IDWH [ancillary proposition/ generalised 
implicature] 
iii. We DUHLQGLIIHUHQWWR'RUD)?VIDWH [direct output of ironic operation] 
 
This clitic pronoun does not contribute to the truth conditional content, but instead, it 
triggers an ancillary proposition (arguably a generalised implicature) of evaluative 
FKDUDFWHU)?to our GLVDSSRLQWPHQW)뀀), which is the element that becomes reversed by the 
ironic operation to mean )꼀wH DUH LQGLIIHUHQW)?. It can be claimed that this example is 
essentially different from examples (9) and (10), since the vehicle is not the whole 
statement in this case: the speaker literally asserts some new information, limiting her 
ironic comment to the use of the ethical dative. Therefore, we have a localised vehicle, 
which triggers the input in the form of a generalised implicature. 
Let us now consider how the following ironic utterance would work in two different 
contexts, (12-i) and (12-ii). 
 
(12) Slow down, Schumacher, you are going to kill us! 
i. Addressed to someone driving too slowly 
ii. Addressed to someone driving very fast but clumsily 
 
In the case of (12-i) the vehicle of the irony is the utterance as a whole. It triggers the 
implication of a very fast and risky driver, enhanced by the metaphorical vocative 
)꼀SFKXPDFKHU)? LH VRPHRQH GULYLQJ DV IDVW DV D ) GULYHU ,Q WKH VHFRQG FRQWH[W
)꼀SFKXPDFKHU)? ZRUNV Ds an ironic interjection in an otherwise literal utterance (i.e. the 
speaker sincerely thinks that there is a danger and the hearer should slow down, while 
ironically pointLQJRXWWKHKHDUHU)?VFOXPVLQHVVDQGdissimilarity from a skilled F1 driver).  
                                            
8 Dative clitic, first person plural. 
9 This is taken from Michelioudakis and Kapogianni (2013), which contains a full discussion of the case of 
ironic uses of the ethical dative, a construction employed in Greek and other languages in order to express 
the emotional involvement of the speaker. 




Summing up, in this section we have analysed examples in which the vehicle and the 
input did not coincide, due to the fact that the input of the ironic operation was triggered 
by the vehicle rather than being part of it. The way in which the input can be triggered by 
(elements of) the vehicle is through (pragmatic) presupposition (7 & 8), through the nature 
of the speech act and its presupposed felicity conditions (9 & 10), or through (generalised) 
implicature (11& 12-i).  
 
3.3  Discourse-dependent input 
Let us now move on to a different set of examples, one that has been rather overlooked 
in the literature (Kapogianni, 2011, 2013, 2014; Dynel, 2013a, b). In these examples, 
which are similar to the very first example (example 1 in 2.1), WKHLURQLVW)?VPDLQLQWHQGHG
meaning is a refutation or ridicule of a targeted utterance, through the strategy of 
juxtaposition.  
 
(13) Context: A grandmother informs her grandson that the local priest will bring the icon 
of Saint Catherine to the house as part of religious tradition 
Sofia: Methavrio tha erthi i Agia Ekaterini 
         )?6DLQW&DWKHULQHLVFRPLQJWKHGD\DIWHUWRPRUURZ)? 
     Spyros: Tha katsete edo i tha tin pate kapu ekso? 
  )?$UH\RXVWD\LQJKHUHRUWDNLQJKHURXW (anywhere)? >VRXUFH)?6WRSDUDSHQWH)뀀 )? 
TV series (Greek)] 
(14) Context: In the classroom, speaker A is a student who has been asked a history 
question and B is her teacher, who is visibly LUULWDWHGE\WKHVWXGHQW)?VKHVLWDQF\DQG
poor attempt at guessing the answer. 
A: Meta to telos tu polemu, i Polonia perilamvane tin (.) ano Silesia (.) tin kato 
  6LOHVLDWLQSHUD6LOHVLD)?  
  )?After the end of the war, Poland included (.) upper Silesia (.) lower Silesia (.) 
\RQGHU6LOHVLD)?)? 
%)뤀ke ti dothe Silesia. 
  )?)?DQGKLWKHU6LOHVLD)?[source: )?Savvatogenimenes)뀀 )? TV series (Greek)] 




(15) Context (as cited on the source text of this example))꼀YRXUIULHQGVPHHW\RXat the 
FDIHWHULDDQGDVN\RX)뤀 )? 
A: Edo iste? 
  HERE10be2PL 
  )?+HUHLVZKHUH\RXDUH" 
B: Ohi, den imaste emis, ta ologramata mas ine! 
  )?1RLW
Vnot us, it's our holograms!)?[Source: Blogs/forums (Greek) ] 
(16) Context: A humorous discussion about the dangers of swimming. 
A: I used to be a lifeguard. 




C: )꼀DRQ)?WGURZQ)뀀 >VRXUFH)?'RWKHULJKWWKLQJ)?)? Podcast] 
  
In example (13) tKHJUDQGVRQ)?VUHVSRQVHLJQRUHVWKHRQO\SODXVLEOHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIZKDW
his grandmother says and, targeting the ambiguity of her utterance, asks an ironic 
question about how they iQWHQGWRHQWHUWDLQWKHLU)꼀gXHVW)? (referring to the saint as a real 
person), ultimately conveying the message )꼀yRXUVWDWHPHQWLVLPSODXVLEOH/unreasonable)뀀. 
As with example (1), the juxtaposition of the question to the targeted statement creates 
WKHVFKHPDV\OORJLVP)?if your statement is reasonable/plausible, so is my question; my 
question is implausible and, therefore, so is your statement)?. It is on the basis of this 
discourse-dependent schema that irony operates, turning the assumption that the initial 
statement is reasonable/plausible into WKH HYDOXDWLYH MXGJPHQW )꼀yRXU VWDWHPHQW LV
unreasonable/implausible)?. 
The dependence of the input on paired utterances (often, but not exclusively, adjacency 
pairs) becomes obvious when examining more examples of this kind, such as (14), where 
collaborative completion serves the purpose of irony. In this case, the teacher ironically 
GHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWWKHVWXGHQW)?VLPSURYLVDWLRQVWUDWHJ\LVIODZHG6LPLODUO\WRH[DPSOH3), 
WKHLQSXWRIWKHLURQLFRSHUDWLRQFRPHVIURPWKHV\OORJLVP)꼀iI\RXUVWUDWHJ\RIPDNLQJXS
                                            
10 7KHZRUG)?edo)?KHUHLVLQDIRFDOLVHGSRVLWLRQLQWKHVHQWence. 




place names is valid, then my proposal is also valid; my proposal is invalid and therefore 
VRLV\RXUV)? 
Example (15) contains a question-answer adjacency pair, in which the answer is 
obviously counterfactual (and humorously surreal, cf. Kapogianni, 2011), again creating 
WKHVFKHPD)?if your question is valid/reasonable, my answer is also valid/reasonable; my 
answer is unreasonable and, therefore, so is your question)?). Similarly, in example (16), 
WKHSDUWLFLSDQWVRIDSRGFDVWFRQWULEXWHWRDQLURQLFPRFNHU\RIVSHDNHU%)?VTXHVWLRQZLWK
speaker C and speaker D collaboratively forming the ironic vehicle, which once again 
creates the VFKHPD )?LI%)?VTXHVWLRQ LVvalid, then the answer is also valid; the answer 
SUHVHQWVDQHQWLUHO\LPSUREDEOHVFHQDULRDQGWKHUHIRUH%)?VTXHVWLRQLVLQYDOLG)뀀. 
In these examples, the ironic operation involves the whole schema, as it is triggered by 
the discourse pairing of the target of the irony and the ironic response. It is worth noting, 
however, that the essential elements of an assertion and its reversal are still present in 
the schema, this time having the form of an evaluative proposition, expressed as the 
DQWHFHGHQWRIDFRQGLWLRQDODQGLWVUHIXWDWLRQ)?XWWHUDQFH[LVYDOLGSODXVLEOHUHDVRQDEOH)?
- )꼀uWWHUDQFH[LVLQYDOLGLPSODXVLEOHXQUHDVRQDEOH)뀀) 
Summing up, the discussion of ironic examples presented in this section (4 )? 16) 
revealed a variety of combinations between vehicle and input: input that is part of the 
vehicle (local) or coincides with the vehicle (global), input that is triggered by the vehicle 
(as an implicature or as a presupposition), and input that is triggered by the discourse 
pairing of the vehicle and the target utterance (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1 Sources of input to the ironic operation 
 
Sources of input to the ironic operation 
    Part of the vehicle          Triggered by the vehicle     Discourse-dependent 
    Global              Local  Implicature    Presupposition 
 




In order fully capture the essence of the ironic operation it is important to answer the 
following remaining questions: (a) is the operation always some kind of meaning reversal? 
and (b) does it only work with a specific form of input (e.g. declarative statements)? The 
following section will shed more light on these issues. 
 
 
 The ironic operation and the role of literal meaning 
 
In this section, I will defend the theoretical validity of analysing irony as an operation that 
involves both semantic and pragmatic aspects of the literal meaning of the utterance. This 
analysis is compatible with a dynamic model of meaning creation that considers the 
VSHDNHU)?VPXOWLSOHJRDOVDQGWKHHYHU-changing context. I will also argue that this model 
can work as an alternative to the )꼀sHPDQWLFLVP YHUVXVexpressivism)뀀 debate (Camp, 
2012), which is rather limiting, since the two views come from different perspectives on 
the semantic-pragmatic divide. 
 
4.1 The unifying characteristics of the ironic operation 
Having analysed a great diversity of examples, the question arises of whether reversal 
can be seen as a unifying characteristic of the ironic operation, despite the differences in 
the logical steps from the input to the output. One could argue (as Partington, 2007, 
Burgers et al, 2011, and Camp, 2012 have done) that given the variable strategies of the 
phenomenon, the only kind of reversal that is common across the board is reversal of 
evaluation. Since irony always expresses some sort of (normally negative) evaluation, this 
can be considered to be the result of the reversal of a pretended evaluation of the opposite 
sort (i.e. normally positive). The evaluative proposition, however, which is indeed always 
present within the ironic meaning, may be an indirect inference, i.e. a further implicature 
drawn on the basis of the result of the ironic reversal and not the direct output of the ironic 
operation. The result of ironic reversal is a statement that may or may not be evaluative, 
like in examples (7) and (15), repeated here as (17) and (18). 
(17)  )?*X\VVWRSILJKWLQJRYHUZKRZLOOKDYHPH)? 
You are fighting over me [presupposition]  Æ Everyone wants me in their team +> No 
one wants me in their team [direct output] 
 +> I am sad/annoyed that no one wants me in their team 




(18)   )?1RLW
VQRWXVLW
VRXUKRORJUDPV)? 




triggers one under the assumption that this is a bad thing for the speaker, who must be 
sad or annoyed about this fact. In the latter example (18), however, which contains the 
syllogism that was introduced in section 2.1 and further illustrated in 3.3 )?if your question 
is valid, then my answer is also valid )? my answer is obviously invalid, therefore your 
question is invalid)뀀)LWLVLQGHHGWKHFDVHWKDWthe direct output of the ironic operation is a 
purely evaluative proposition. 
Having established that irony reverses different kinds of expressed meaning and not 
just evaluations, it is now worth determining the form of meaning that becomes reversed 
by irony. Haverkate (1990) sees irony as preserving the modality of the sentence (e.g. 
[ironic imperative (p)]  >LPSHUDWLYHnp)]; ibid: 95). It has been shown, however, that the 
interaction between irony and modality is more complex and can reasonably be seen as 
reversing the presuppositions of speech acts (section 3.2, examples 9 & 10). In the case 
of questions, imperatives, and elliptic phrases, irony reverses a declarative sentence that 
is linked (by presupposition, entailment or pragmatic enrichment) to the utterance, and not 
the sentence itself. 
A further indication that the meaning that becomes reversed is in a declarative form 
comes from the observation that ironic implicatures, both evaluative and non-evaluative, 
can be intuitively understood in the form of statements. As demonstrated by the discussed 
examples (especially the analysis in section 2.1), ironic meaning consists of a bundle of 
propositions, which correspond to a bundle of statements. These are mostly connected to 
each other within a syllogism (premises )? conclusions), while the direct output of the ironic 
operation has a logical priority over the rest. It would therefore be problematic to consider 
any other form/modality for the direct output of the ironic meaning, since this would disturb 
the logical continuity of the constituents of the ironic meaning. Consequently, if the direct 
output is a declarative statement, then the input also has to be a declarative statement.  
There is, of course, the case of localised operation of the phenomenon as it was shown 
in the examples of oxymoron and ethical datives, where there is no whole declarative 
sentence to be reversed but a subsentential element. In the case of localised operation, 




one can view the process of reversal as a more concrete link between two antonyms. This 
link can either be between two lexicalised antonyms, usually opposite points of a given 
semantic scale (e.g. hot-cold, fast-slow, perfect-terrible, slight-extreme), or between the 
extremes of an ad-hoc scale (e.g. speed-of-light )? terribly slow, Einstein )? terribly stupid). 
ThiVLVFRPSDWLEOHZLWK&DPS)?VREVHUYDWLRQDERXWWKHDELOLW\RILURQ\WRHYRNHDQRUPDWLYH
scale (Camp, 2012, also following Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995) and Giora)?V
suggestion that irony is indirect negation (Giora, 1995).  
The examination of examples supports the view of irony as an operation of reversal that 
takes as its input various elements of the expressed meaning. When reversal is global, 
then it operates on declarative sentences, when it is local it operates on subsentential 
elements that are reversed to mean their scalar antonyms. According to this view of irony, 
the literal interpretation is essential for the derivation of ironic meaning, since it either 
directly or indirectly provides the input to the ironic operation. 
 
4.2 A discourse-oriented view of ironic meaning 
The expressivist view of irony (defined by Camp, 2012 as the view that there is only one 
meaning in irony and no meaning substitution takes place), most notably represented by 
Relevance Theory and the interpretation of irony as echo or pretense, would not accept 
the inclusion of literal meaning in a model of ironic meaning derivation (Camp, 2012). This 
point of view has three central arguments against literal meaning (a) psychological reality: 
a two-stage process of irony understanding should make irony processing more effortful, 
which is not what is expected to happen according to the requirement for the least 
cognitive effort (b) the precondition for LURQ\ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LV UHFRJQL]LQJ WKHVSHDNHU)?s 
dissociative attitude (as opposed to recognizing the incongruity between the literal 
meaning and reality/context), and (c) irony can also apply to overall pragmatic effects, as 
opposed to just the literal meaning (Camp, 2012). 
As it concerns the first argument of expressivism, it would appear that evidence from 
processing studies should provide a straightforward answer to whether irony is more 
effortful than literal meaning. However, results from different studies on the topic are 
inconclusive11. Despite some experimental findings that support the direct-access view 
                                            
11 There are, of course, various factors that can influence the speed of access to the ironic meaning, 
which are still being investigated. For example, it has been shown that the familiarity and degree of 




(Jorgensen, Miller, and Sperber, 1984; Gibbs, 1986, 2002), a number of (recent) studies 
find evidence of slower reading times / processing of ironic meaning (Dews and Winner, 
1999; Giora and Fein, 1999; Schwoebel et al, 2000; Giora 2002, 2003, Giora et al. 2007; 
Filik and Moxey, 2010; Peleg & Giora, 2011; Akimoto et al., 2012). The studies by Giora 
and colleagues, in particular, attribute the slower processing of irony to the initial activation 
of salient meanings (i.e. not necessarily literal, but frequent and familiar). In an attempt to 
explain these divergent findings, Spotorno and Noveck (2014) take into consideration 
individual differences in theory of mind skills and social inclination. 
Of course, the debate between a direct-access and a two-stage view assumes a linear 
model of processing (the salience-based interpretation is accessed first, the intended 
meaning is accessed second), an alternative to ZKLFKZRXOGEHWKH)?SDUDOOHOUDFH)뀀 PRGHO
(Dews and Winner 1999:RU)꼀mXOWLSOH PHDQLQJ)? model that does not predict a strict 
linear order of access to different sources of meaning during processing. It is therefore 
debatable whether evidence from processing can provide direct support for one model or 
the other, given the multiplicity of factors involved in irony processing and the difficulty to 
control for them. 
The second argument of expressivism is not unrelated to the first: a goal for 
expressivism is finding )꼀sKRUWFXWV)뀀 LQmeaning interpretation, which is what the echoic view 
of irony tries to explain (not incompatible with similDUYLHZVVXFKDV)꼀rHPLQGHU)?)꼀pUHWHQVH)뀀,
)꼀aOOXVLRQDO SUHWHQVH)뀀, VHH &ODUN 	 *HUULJ, 1984; Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989; Kumon-
Nakamura et al, 1995; Popa-Wyatt, 2014). 5HFRJQLVLQJWKHVSHDNHU)?VGLVVRFLDWLYHDWWLWXGH
isDFFRUGLQJWRWKLVYLHZDVKRUWFXWWRWKHVSHDNHU)?VLQWHQGHGPHDQLQJZKLFKE\SDVVHV
the literal interpretation. What some of these approaches seem to be taking for granted is 
that the identification of tKHVSHDNHU)?VGLVVRFLDWLYHDWWLWXGH RUKLJKHU OHYHOH[SOLFDWXUH
leads directly to the spHDNHU)?V LQWHQGHG PHDQLQJ $V VKRZQ earlier (section 2.2), the 
VSHDNHU)?VLQWHQGHGPHDQLQJLVDEXQGOHRILQWHUUHODWHGSURSRVLWLRQVWKHUHDUHSURSRVLWLRQV
that have to do with asserting something other than what is said and propositions that are 
purely evaluative )? the former do not always coincide with the latter. So how does 
                                            
conventionalisation of an ironic utterance affects ironic interpretation, and the effects of novel ironies on eye-
movement and brain activity can also be attested (Filik et al, 2014). Additionally, some default sarcastic 
SKUDVHVQRWDEO\QHJDWLYHXQGHUVWDWHPHQWVVXFKDV)?SXQFWXDOLW\LVQRWKLVIRUWH)?) do not involve a phase of 
literal interpretation, even when these are nonsalient (Giora et al, 2014, 2015).  





Although some of them may be straightforward (dissociative attitude )? act of evaluation), 
RWKHUVPD\UHTXLUHIXUWKHUVWDJHVWKHVSHDNHUGRHVQ)?WPHDQS)? the speaker means the 
reverse of p). Taking everything into consideration, a dissociative attitude model does not 
necessarily lead to direct-access processing and is not necessarily less complex than the 
process that involves the literal interpretation. 
The third argument is the trickiest one for expressivism, since it can be turned against 
it (as Camp, 2012 also notes). The observation that irony also operates on the overall 
pragmatic effects of the utterance can be problematic for an echoic model. Even if we 
assume the more relaxed definition of echo/echoic attribution (i.e. what is echoed is not 
necessarily a previous utterance, but it can be a thought, a situation, or something that a 
different speaker would have said under different circumstances) the irony needs to 
coincide with the echo, in other words, if an utterance is echoed, then it is the utterance 
as a whole that carries the irony, nothing more or nothing less. This assumption would not 
be compatible with the observation that irony also uses indirect ridicule, where the irony 
applies to an implicature or a presupposition of the utterance and not to the utterance 
itself. At the same time, the assumption that the irony is carried by the utterance as a 
whole would also be incompatible with the cases where irony applies to subsentential 
elements (e.g. the discussed cases of oxymoron and ethical dative). If the speaker is 
dissociating herself from the content of the utterance, how can she still literally assert parts 
of the utterance in the case of local irony? 
It may be expected that recognising the flaws of the expressivist view would lead the 
present analysis to support the other side of the debate, i.e. semanticism. This is not the 
case. Semanticism prioritises a structural/syntactic model that aims at a unification of rules 
of meaning composition (cf. the view of irony as an operator that works similarly to 
negation )? Camp, 2012:624). This means that, in terms of research goals, it is not the 
polar opposite of expressivism, which prioritises a cognitive approach.  
Even if it were the alternative option to expressivism, however, such a position would 
still be problematic. Semanticism places irony right on the semantics-pragmatics 
boundary, with its operation being tied to the level of semantics, at least in terms of 
function. This position is at odds with the observation that irony can operate on fully-
fledged propositions, which are often the result of pragmatic processes (implicatures, for 
instance). Such a function indicates that irony is a higher-level phenomenon, despite the 




fact that it can also operate at a lower level (local operation) and independently of the fact 
that its input is rooted/dependent on the literal meaning.  
Moving away from the semanticism-expressivism debate, an analysis of the ironic 
process needs to take into consideration the multiplicity of meanings involved. Viewing 
irony as a complex pragmatic phenomenon, rather than a higher-level explicature or an 
operator, offers the opportunity of an analysis that takes into consideration the dynamic 
character of the context and the process of meaning negotiation between interlocutors.  
Although in a static description of examples we refer to the speaker and the hearer as 
having steady roles, what happens in reality is that both interlocutors retain both roles at 
the same time. This is an important observation for the examination of meaning 
FRQVWUXFWLRQDVSHDNHULVFRQVWDQWO\DZDUHRIWKHKHDUHU)?VVWDWHRIPLQGDQGLVSUHSDUHG
to modulate her strategy (e.g. reinforce or cancel an implicature that seems possible to 
DULVHJLYHQWKHFXUUHQWKHDUHU)?VDVVXPSWLRQVLQRUGHUWRDFFRP RGDte new information 
DERXWWKHFXUUHQWKHDUHU)?VVHWRIDVVXPSWLRQV 
Moreover, communicative goals are rarely ever singular; this means that speakers and 
hearers have a hierarchy of goals, the order of which is affected by many different factors. 
The reason why one opts for an ironic rather than OLWHUDOXWWHUDQFHLHD)꼀mDUNHG)뀀 DQGOHVV
straightforward one, would have to lie beyond the goal of simply transmitting a message. 
The ironist chooses this device, despite its more complex nature and the risk of 
misinterpretation. Therefore, the use of irony reveals an important principle of 
communication, which occasionally grants priority on the rhetorical effects over the 
economy and efficiency of the communicated utterance. Unlike what an efficiency-oriented 
approach might suppose, there is evidence for the preference towards nonliteral 
communication (Dascal, 1987; Nerlich and Clarke, 2001) and, more specifically, towards 
the duality of meanings, i.e. rhetorical strategies that invite the hearer to retain both the 
literal and the nonliteral meaning at the same time, and capture the rhetorical effect 
through the observation of the discrepancy between the two meanings. 
The inclusion of the above considerations into the analysis of irony leads us to a 
discourse-oriented approach. In this approach, every aspect of the ironic meaning 
construction is important, it can be exploited to a greater or lesser degree by the 
interlocutors, and it cannot be bypassed.  
 
 Conclusions 





This paper has highlighted some important distinctions that are often overlooked in the 
irony literature, causing confusions and pseudo-dilemmas. Through the examination of 
real (spontaneous and scripted) instantiations of the phenomenon WKH WHUPV )꼀iURQLF
RSHUDWLRQ)뀀, )꼀iQSXW)뀀, )꼀vHKLFOH)뀀, DQG )꼀(GLUHFW RXWSXW)뀀 ZHUHGHILQ G DQG GLVWLQJXLVKHG IURP
each other. The output was analysed as a bundle of propositions, which include - but are 
not limited to - the direct result of the ironic operation (direct output). Even more crucially, 
a distinction between ironic vehicle and ironic input was drawn, showing that ironic 
strategies vary depending on the relationship between the two (input as part of the vehicle, 
triggered by the vehicle, or dependent on the discourse functions of the vehicle). The 
subsequent analysis supported the view of irony as an operation of reversal: regardless 
of whether the input is a proposition or a subsentential element, irony exhibits 
systematicity as it concerns the relationship between input and direct output.  
The discussion also highlighted the fact that the input is always linked to the literal 
meaning of the utterance, which makes a strong argument for a model that recognises the 
role of the literal meaning, contrary to what has been proposed by the so-called 
expressivist approach. Further arguments against the expressivist approach, 
complemented by arguments that criticise the expressivist-semanticist dichotomy for 
being restrictive and not based on a true opposition, lead to the proposal of a model that 
recognises the dynamic nature and discourse-dependence of ironic meaning. It is hoped 
that this approach will contribute to future theoretical as well as empirical studies on irony, 
since the proposed distinctions not only offer a clearer view of the phenomenon but can 
also be a source of valuable methodological distinctions (e.g. perceptual studies could use 
)?source of input)? as an additional predictor). 
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